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Start-Up Sports Leagues: Why These 
Leagues Are Entitled to Use the Ruinous 
Competition Defense to Justify 
Anticompetitive Restraints 
Marc P. Schwartz* 
INTRODUCTION 
Antitrust law does not yield a consistent principle about the proper 
characterization of sports leagues.1  A leagues teams are considered 
to be a joint venture of independent teams for most purposes,2 and in 
rare instances, may be characterized as a single entity3 for other 
purposes.4  This characterization of a league as a single entity has 
traditionally been extremely important because the Sherman Act 
contains an important distinction between concerted and independent 
action.5  Section 1 of the Sherman Act does not apply to true single 
 
* J.D. candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2002; B.A., cum laude, University of 
Pennsylvania, 1998.  I would like to thank Professor Mark Patterson for his invaluable 
guidance and advice, and my family and friends for their patience and support. 
 1 Robert E. Freitas, Overview: Looking Ahead at Sports and the Antitrust Law, 
ANTITRUST (2000).  There has been a great deal of litigation about whether sports leagues 
should be considered single entities by the courts.  See N. Am. Soccer League v. Natl 
Football League, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982); L.A. Meml Coliseum Commn v. Natl 
Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984); Chi. Profl Sports Ltd. Pship v. Natl 
Basketball Assn, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that some aspects of a league could 
be characterized as a single entity, while others may not). 
 2 See Chi. Profl Sports Ltd. Pship v. Natl Basketball Assn, 874 F. Supp. 844 (N.D. 
Ill. 1995). 
 3 In the sports context, a single entity is a single economic unit that is centrally 
controlled and whose actors perform as one.  The teams within a single-entity league are not 
owned by any one person or entity.  See Heike K. Sullivan, Comment, Fraser v. Major 
League Soccer: The MLSs Single-Entity Structure Is a Sham, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 865, n.7 
(2000).  All of the investors in the League contribute to the League as a whole.  Id. 
 4 For example, the NBA is considered a single entity solely for the purpose of 
negotiating its national television contract.  Chi. Profl, 95 F.3d at 600. 
 5 See Freitas, supra note 1, at 16 (citing Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube 
Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984) (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 
752, 761 (1984))). 
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entities, but does apply to any combination in restraint of trade.6  A 
league is thus immune from antitrust scrutiny under section 1 of the 
Sherman Act if it is characterized as a single entity. 
New sports leagues have recently emerged in mens and womens 
soccer, womens basketball, and mens football.7  These leagues 
were specifically formed as single entities to take advantage of the 
supposed economic benefits,8 and perhaps more importantly, to 
avoid antitrust scrutiny. 9  Regardless of whether the new leagues are 
true single entities, however, I will argue in this Note that antitrust 
scrutiny of these new leagues should be relaxed while they are in 
their beginning stages of development. 
This relaxed antitrust scrutiny is necessary because start-up 
professional sports leagues are more risky than other industries and 
have staggering start-up costs.  This Note argues that new leagues, in 
their initial development (regardless of whether they are a true single 
entity), should be permitted to behave in ways that would otherwise 
be considered anticompetitive, in order to create some level of 
comfort for league owners and investors that heavy start-up costs can 
be recouped.  Without the ability to impose regulations that reduce 
competition among the member teams, it is likely that the new 
leagues will fail.  They would likely fail because vigorous 
 
 6 Section 1 of the Sherman Act states in relevant part: Every contract, combination . . . 
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is hereby declared illegal.  15 U.S.C. § 
1 (2001). 
 7 The mens soccer league, Major League Soccer [hereinafter MLS], played its 
inaugural season in 1996.  The womens professional soccer league, the Womens United 
Soccer Association [hereinafter WUSA], played its inaugural season in 2001.  Two 
womens basketball leagues, the Womens National Basketball Association [hereinafter 
WNBA] and the American Basketball League, played their inaugural seasons in 1997.  The 
new mens football league, the XFL, played its first and only season in 2001. 
 8 Preventing skyrocketing salaries, maintaining competitive balance, and enhancing 
advertising revenue are all thought to be easier under this league structure. 
 9 See Rob Atherton, Note, Fraser v. Major League Soccer (MLS): The Future of the 
Single-Entity League and the International Transfer System, 66 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 887, 889-
90 (1998) (describing how new sports leagues have been formed as single entities). The 
single-entity structure adopted by MLS, however, has been termed a sham and charged 
with violating both section 1 and section 2 of the Sherman Act.  Fraser v. Major League 
Soccer, L.L.C., 7 F. Supp. 2d 73 (D. Mass. 1998).  The court in Fraser ruled in favor of 
MLS, holding that the league is a single entity and thus ruling out any possibility of a 
section 1 violation.  Id.  This decision is currently on appeal. 
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competition among a leagues teams would drive costs to 
prohibitively high levels, and consequently, no league would be able 
to exist. 
The history of sports leagues in America confirms that consumers 
benefit from the emergence of new, financially sound leagues.10  
There are significant benefits that a city can realize from having a 
successful professional franchise.  These benefits include an increase 
in jobs, an increase in tax revenues for the city, urban redevelopment 
surrounding the arena or stadium, and an increase in civic pride.11  
These benefits, however, are not likely to accrue to the new leagues 
that have started in the past decade.  This is because the new leagues 
are so concerned about the possibility of failure that they are unlikely 
to make risky, large capital investments that could increase the 
likelihood of long-term success. 
The Supreme Court typically rejects the argument that ruinous 
competition12 among competitors warrants agreements among those 
competitors to restrict competition.13  Courts, however, have 
embraced a modified form of the ruinous competition defense in 
some cases involving the National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(hereinafter NCAA).14  Over the past two decades, courts have 
permitted the NCAA to justify restrictions that would traditionally be 
deemed anticompetitive by allowing the NCAA to argue that 
particular restraints are necessary to preserve amateurism and 
maintain competitive balance among its member schools.15  The 
 
 10 See Christian M. McBurney, Note, The Legality of Sports Leagues Restrictive 
Admissions Practices, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 925, 941 (1985). 
 11 See infra notes 108-13 and accompanying text. 
 12 The term ruinous competition refers to industry competitors competing so 
vigorously that they ultimately drive each other out of business.  See Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Essay, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of Industrial Organization, 68 TEX. L. REV. 
105, 123 (1989). 
 13 See, e.g., Natl Socy of Profl Engrs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689-90 (1978); 
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 220-24 (1940). 
 14 The NCAA is a private, nonprofit association consisting of approximately 1,000 
academically accredited universities in the United States.  Stephen M. Schott, Give Them 
What They Deserve: Compensating the Student-Athlete for Participation in Intercollegiate 
Athletics, 3 SPORTS LAW. J. 25, 30 (1996).  The NCAA is divided into three divisions based 
upon the size and competitive level of the athletic programs.  Id. 
 15 See, e.g., Adidas Am., Inc. v. Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1097 
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NCAA argues that without rules that preserve amateurism and 
maintain competitive balance, member schools would drive each 
other out of business.  The NCAA reasons that the high costs 
associated with attracting labor inputs (the student-athletes) in a free 
market will reduce parity because so few schools would be able to 
pay marquee student-athletes their market value.  Thus, these high 
costs would significantly diminish consumer demand for NCAA 
sports, consequently eliminating the NCAA as we know it. 
Courts continue to accept the NCAAs arguments that its 
anticompetitive restraints are necessary to preserve amateurism and 
competitive balance among member institutions despite the rampant 
commercialization and professionalization of big-time college 
athletics.  In light of holdings with regard to cases involving the 
NCAA, it is appropriate that courts assess the evolving 
characteristics of professional sports leagues, particularly start-up 
leagues, in deciding the appropriate applicability of the antitrust 
laws.16 
This Note will argue that courts should provide treatment to start-
up sports leagues that is similar to their treatment of the NCAA.  Part 
I will explain how the NCAA has justified its restrictions by arguing 
that they are needed to preserve amateurism and competitive balance 
among member schools.  Part I will also prove that courts implicitly 
allow use of the ruinous competition argument by accepting the 
NCAAs arguments.  Part II will discuss courts treatment of the 
ruinous competition argument in a non-sports context.  Part III will 
argue that similar to how courts have treated some of the restraints of 
the NCAA, courts should permit a start-up sports leagues restraints 
to exist because of the unique, risky nature of sports and the 
procompetitive benefits that sports leagues generate. 
 
(D. Kan. 1999); McCormack v. Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 
1988); Hennessey v. Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 16 Thane N. Rosenbaum, The Antitrust Implications of Professional Sports Leagues 
Revisited: Emerging Trends in the Modern Era, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 729, 760 (1987). 
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I. THE NCAAS ARGUMENTS TO JUSTIFY THEIR RESTRICTIONS 
In challenges to its restrictions, the NCAA usually argues that its 
restraints are justified for two reasons.  The first justification is that 
its restrictions are necessary to preserve amateurism.  The second 
justification is that its restrictions are necessary to maintain 
competitive balance among member schools.  Embedded in these 
two arguments is the underlying defense that the restrictions are 
necessary to preserve the current product of intercollegiate sports by 
enabling member schools to refrain from competing with each other 
off the field for labor inputs (student-athletes).  Indeed, in some cases 
the NCAA has expressly stated that without its restrictions, the 
product of college sports would fail.17  The NCAA has thus used a 
modified version of the ruinous competition defense to justify its 
conduct. 
Ruinous competition typically refers to a situation where in the 
absence of an agreement, firms in a particular industry drive 
themselves out of business because of vigorous competition.18  This 
competition leads either to the end of the industry or the survival of 
one competitor that is then able to demand monopoly prices.19  This 
typical ruinous competition defense focuses on what will happen to 
the supply of firms in a particular industry when the firms compete 
with each other. 
In cases challenging its restrictions, the NCAA has used the 
ruinous competition defense by suggesting that in the absence of its 
rules, the product of intercollegiate sports would be destroyed 
because of fierce competition among member schools.20  In these 
NCAA cases, however, the NCAA seems to use a modified form of 
the traditional ruinous competition defense because it addresses both 
the supply and demand side of its industry. 
 
 17 Law v. Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn, 134 F.3d 1010, 1023 (10th Cir. 1998) (The 
NCAA argues that reducing costs can be considered a procompetitive justification because 
doing so is necessary to maintain the existence of competitive intercollegiate sports.). 
 18 See Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 127. 
 19 Id. 
 20 See Law, 134 F.3d at 1023; Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1153. 
SCHWRTZ.FINAL 2/15/02  3:01 PM 
652 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 12 
 
The NCAAs ruinous competition defense is based on the premise 
that any reduction in the supply of teams could lead to the 
destruction of its organization.  In the absence of its rules the NCAA 
seems to fear that:  a) the costs of maintaining a competitive athletic 
program would be so high that many schools would abandon their 
programs, thus destroying the NCAA as we know it because of a 
huge reduction in the supply of schools fielding teams; and b) 
competitive balance, or parity, among member schools would 
disappear, thus reducing consumers demand to see NCAA sports 
because of a lack of close contests, and thus also leading to the 
destruction of the NCAA as we know it. 
Section A of this Part defines and explains the importance of 
amateurism to the NCAA, and explains how the notion of 
amateurism has been used by the NCAA to justify restrictions that 
reduce competition among member schools.  Section B of this Part 
explains how the NCAAs argument that its rules are necessary to 
maintain competitive balance is tantamount to arguing that the rules 
are necessary to prevent ruinous competition among member 
schools.  Section C analyzes the courts treatment of such arguments. 
A. The Significance and Meaning of Amateurism to the NCAA 
The NCAA was founded upon the ideal of amateurism.21  To 
maintain amateurism in intercollegiate sports, the NCAA has created 
an extensive set of rules that identifies permissible conduct by 
student-athletes enabling them to retain their eligibility.22  Student-
athletes are prohibited from participating in intercollegiate sports if 
they  sign a contract with an  agent, declare themselves  eligible for a  
 
 21 See infra notes 22-28 and accompanying text. 
 22 The NCAA Constitution is a manual that defines, inter alia, the purpose of the NCAA 
and numerous eligibility requirements that its member institutions must follow.  NCAA 
Constitution, available at http://www.ncaa.org (last visited Oct. 1, 2001) [hereinafter 
Const.].  One of the purposes of the NCAA is, [t]o encourage its members to adopt 
eligibility rules to comply with . . . standards of scholarship, sportsmanship and 
amateurism.  Id. at art. 1.2(c). 
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professional draft in the sport in which they participate, or receive 
any type of payment based upon their athletic skill.23 
Amateurism has many meanings to the NCAA.  It would be too 
narrow a definition to say that amateurism simply means that 
student-athletes should play for the love of the game,24 or that 
amateurism is strictly about prohibiting student-athletes from 
receiving any form of payment based upon their skill in a particular 
sport. 25  Amateurism is an ideal that the NCAA relies upon because 
it believes that the amateurism of the players and member schools 
(for not paying their players) differentiates collegiate athletics from 
their professional counterparts, and has enabled college sports to 
flourish.26 
The NCAA believes that the amateur nature of intercollegiate 
sports creates a unique product that holds a special appeal for 
consumers.27  The NCAA also believes that preserving amateurism 
enables student-athletes to be protected from exploitation by 
commercial enterprises, such as shoe manufacturers and 
unscrupulous agents.28 
More importantly for the NCAA, though, maintaining amateurism 
helps the organization keep costs down by permitting schools to field 
athletic programs without competing for players by paying them to 
come to a particular school.  The relatively low cost of funding teams 
(compared to a situation in which schools actually paid players their 
market value) enables all schools to continue to field athletic 
programs, and consequently preserves the existence of college sports. 
 
 23 Id. at art. 12. 
 24 See Schott, supra note 14, at 31 (stating that amateurism means that student-athletes 
play for the love of the game). 
 25 See Const., supra note 12, at art. 12. 
 26 See Chad W. Pekron, The Professional Student-Athlete: Undermining Amateurism as 
an Antitrust Defense in NCAA Compensation Challenges, 24 HAMLINE L. REV. 24, 28 
(2000) (noting that the NCAA has successfully convinced the public that paying college 
athletes is a bad idea). 
 27 Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 
101-02 (1984) (In order to preserve the character and quality of the product, athletes must 
not be paid, must be required to attend class, and the like.). 
 28 See Const., supra note 22, at art. 2.9. 
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In Law v. NCAA, the NCAA defended a rule that limited the salary 
of a restricted-earnings basketball coach by explicitly justifying it as 
a cost-cutting measure.29  The court, however, was dubious that the 
goal of cost reduction was a sufficient legal justification, and 
ultimately rejected the rule on different grounds.30  As a result of the 
dicta in Law, however, the NCAA is forced to use euphemisms like 
preserving amateurism, as a means to justify cost-cutting rules that 
maintain the number of schools fielding athletic teams. 
In several cases challenging particular NCAA restrictions, the 
NCAA justifies its rules by arguing that they are necessary to 
preserve amateurism.31  The NCAA argues that preserving 
amateurism is important because it enables fair competition and a 
level playing field among its member schools.  Fair competition 
and level playing field function as euphemisms for the NCAA.  
These are code words that the NCAA uses when it fears that the 
product of intercollegiate sports is at risk of self-destructing because 
of rising costs or disparate revenue streams among member schools. 
Arguing that its rules preserve amateurism is an implicit use of the 
ruinous competition defense by the NCAA.  This is because the 
NCAA fears that in the absence of many of its rules, competition 
among member schools would cause the end of intercollegiate 
athletics because of schools abandonment of their athletic programs 
due to either high costs or low levels of consumer interest.32 
 
 29 Law v. Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn, 134 F.3d 1010, 1023 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 30 Id. 
 31 See Adidas Am., Inc. v. Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (D. 
Kan. 1999) (arguing that a rule limiting the size of corporate logos permissible on a jersey 
and other uniform-related apparel was necessary to maintain amateurism); Justice v. Natl 
Collegiate Athletic Assn, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983) (arguing that the imposition of 
penalties against a member school that violated NCAA rules were necessary to preserve 
amateurism and enhance fair competition among the member schools); Banks v. Natl 
Collegiate Athletic Assn, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992) (arguing that the NCAAs rule 
prohibiting a player from signing with an agent and declaring himself eligible for a 
professional draft was necessary to preserve the amateurism of college sports); Gaines v. 
Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn, 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (arguing that the no-
draft rule was necessary to preserve amateurism among member schools). 
 32 See Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 383 (The NCAA sanction program was designed to 
prevent intercollegiate athletic programs from being driven by the pressures to remain 
competitive into committing practices that threaten both the competitive and amateur 
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In its cases, arguing about the importance of preserving 
amateurism is important because it allows the NCAA to prevent 
member schools from paying players, and thus competing with each 
other on the basis of price.  The NCAA fears that if amateurism 
disappears, the cost of having a competitive athletic program will be 
prohibitive and destroy collegiate sports.33  Of course the big 
programs would likely survive, but apparently the NCAA does not 
believe that the product of college sports could thrive under this 
scenario. 
Commentators have suggested that the NCAA divide itself into 
new divisions based on the level of funding and competitiveness of a 
program.34  The NCAA has never responded to these proposals, 
presumably because they fear that a new version of the NCAA 
featuring only the Top Twenty teams, or the Top Forty teams, lacks 
the same allure as the current configuration.  A significant 
modification to the NCAA, like having an organization with only 
twenty teams, would create an entirely new product. 
The NCAA wants to maintain the status quo because of the huge 
financial success that the organization has enjoyed.  To maintain the 
status quo, the NCAA has justified its numerous regulations on the 
basis that they preserve amateurism.  Embedded in this argument is 
the use of a modified version of the ruinous competition argument.  
The NCAA believes that without these restrictions, vigorous 
competition between member schools would cause the product of 
college sports to be destroyed because many schools would not have 
the financial wherewithal to maintain an athletic program. 
 
nature of the programs.) (citing Hennessey v. Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn, 564 F.2d 
1136, 1153 (5th Cir. 1977); Law, 134 F.3d at 1023 (The NCAA argues that reducing 
costs . . . is necessary to maintain the existence of competitive intercollegiate sports.). 
 33 See Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1153; Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 382. 
 34 Schott, supra note 14, at 43. 
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B. The Restrictions Are Intended to Maintain Competition among 
Member Schools 
The preservation of competitive balance among member schools is 
also frequently cited as a justification for NCAA restrictions.35  The 
maintenance of competitive balance refers to maintaining parity 
among the member schools athletic programs.  This desire for 
competitive balance is unique to the sports industry because teams 
need close games for a compelling product to exist and for 
consumers to remain interested in the product.36  This, of course, is 
untrue in other industries. 
In several cases challenging NCAA restrictions, the NCAA has 
justified rules on the grounds that they maintain competitive balance 
among member schools.37  The NCAA made this argument in one 
case because, [f]inancial pressures upon many members, not merely 
to catch up, but to keep up, were beginning to threaten both the 
competitive, and the amateur, nature of the programs, leading quite 
possibly to abandonment by many.38  Abandonment of athletic 
programs by member schools would obviously threaten the very 
existence of the NCAA. 
The preservation of competition argument is thus also tied to the 
NCAAs use of the ruinous competition defense because the NCAA 
fears that in the absence of its rules, schools will cease fielding 
athletic programs and balanced competition among the remaining 
schools will disappear.39  In the absence of legitimate competition 
 
 35 Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1153; Law, 134 F.3d at 1023; Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 383; 
Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117 
(1984); McCormack v. Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn, 845 F.2d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 
1988); Smith v. Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn, 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 36 Gary R. Roberts, Sports Leagues and the Sherman Act: The Use and Abuse of Section 
1 to Regulate Restraints on Intraleague Rivalry, 32 UCLA L. REV. 219, 231 (1984). 
 37 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 38 Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1153. 
 39 See Law, 134 F.3d at 1022 (contending that limiting one of the four available 
coaching positions on a Division I basketball team to an entry-level position will create 
more balanced competition by barring some teams from hiring four experienced coaches 
rather than three). 
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among its schools, the NCAA worries that demand for its product 
will cease, leading to the destruction of the NCAA (if it even existed 
after some schools abandoned their athletic programs). 
The maintenance of competitive balance is thus necessary to 
preserve the existence of the NCAA, because the organization fears 
that in the absence of its rules, a larger chasm than already exists 
(financially and qualitatively) among member schools athletic 
programs would develop.  Only a limited number of schools would 
be able to afford to fund a competitive athletic program, leading to a 
wider disparity in the quality of teams.  This, in turn, would lead to 
reduced consumer demand for NCAA sports and consequently, the 
demise of the NCAA. 
Although ruinous competition usually relates to the supply of an 
industry being harmed, the situations presented in the NCAA cases 
are different.  The NCAAs justifications aim to preserve both the 
supply and demand of their product, because if both the supply and 
the demand do not remain high, the NCAA believes that college 
sports will be unable to exist.  This is because the supply of teams 
has a significant impact on the demand for the product.  Without a 
large number of member schools fielding athletic teams, consumer 
interest would significantly diminish, and the NCAA would likely no 
longer exist as we know it. 
C. Courts Treatment of NCAA Justifications 
The Supreme Court strongly suggested in NCAA v. Board of 
Regents40 that NCAA rules designed to preserve amateurism and 
competitive balance do not violate the antitrust laws.41  While the 
Court has rejected a blanket exemption for all NCAA restrictions, it 
has still shown great deference in permitting the NCAA to enact 
restrictions that would typically be classified as unreasonable 
 
 40 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 41 Mathew J. Mitten, Applying Antitrust Law to NCAA Regulation of Big-Time 
College Athletics: The Need to Shift from Nostalgic 19th and 20th Century Ideals of 
Amateurism to the Economic Realities of the 21st Century, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 1, 4 
(2000) (citing Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101-02). 
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restraints of trade in other industries.42  Indeed, one NCAA rule was 
upheld by the Court, despite the acknowledged effect that the rule 
reduced competition among member institutions.43 
In Law, the court was dubious, however, about accepting an 
explicit defense from the NCAA that one of its rules was a cost-
cutting measure.44  As a result the NCAA is forced to disguise the 
purpose behind some of its rules.  Consequently, NCAA arguments 
proffered to courts focus on the preservation of amateurism and the 
maintenance of competitive balance among member schools.  It is 
clear, though, that underlying the justifications offered by the NCAA 
is a belief that without the restrictions the NCAA would collapse 
because of the vigorous competition that would ensue among 
member schools for student-athletes (the inputs into the labor 
market), and the resulting lack of consumer demand for its product.  
Perhaps the NCAA would be viable in a different form with fewer 
members.  Courts, however, have not suggested this alternative, 
despite the relative obviousness of this idea.  This indicates that 
courts recognize that the NCAA is a unique product that may only be 
sustainable in something close to its existing form. 
The courts accept the NCAAs argument that in the absence of its 
rules, the product of college sports would be destroyed.  Indeed, one 
court stated, in general, the NCAAs eligibility rules allow for the 
survival of the product, and allow for an even playing field.45  By 
embracing the NCAAs arguments that restrictions aimed to preserve 
amateurism and competitive balance are justified, courts accept the 
NCAAs modified version of the ruinous competition defense.  The 
 
 42 McCormack v. Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn, 845 F.2d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(The eligibility rules create the product and allow its survival in the face of 
commercializing pressures.). 
 43 Smith v. Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn, 139 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998) (analyzing 
a rule that prevents an athlete from participating in intercollegiate athletics as a graduate 
student at a different university from where the athlete did their undergraduate work).  The 
court stated, [c]learly, the rule discourages institutions with graduate or professional 
schools from inducing undergraduates at other institutions to forgo participating in the 
athletic programs at their undergraduate institutions in order to preserve eligibility to 
participate in intercollegiate athletics on a postbaccalaureate basis.  Id. 
 44 Law, 134 F.3d at 1023. 
 45 Smith, 139 F.3d at 187. 
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courts have probably not commented on the NCAAs unorthodox 
application of the ruinous competition defense because the NCAA 
has not explicitly argued that they are actually using this defense. 
Perhaps courts have accepted the NCAAs version of the ruinous 
competition defense because they recognize that the sports industry 
differs from other industries where the ruinous competition defense 
has been rejected, because teams within a league are not true 
economic competitors.46  Teams within a league need competitive 
balance to ensure consumer interest in the product.  Agreements 
among teams in the same league are therefore not analogous to 
agreements among competitors in the same industry.  In non-sports 
industries, agreements are more harmful because they restrict 
competition within an industry.  In sports leagues, however, 
agreements among teams may actually enhance the development of 
the league. 
Having thus accepted the ruinous competition justification with 
regards to the NCAA, courts should feel comfortable permitting a 
new sports league to use this defense to justify its restrictions.  If 
start-up sports leagues are unable to justify their conduct on the basis 
of preventing ruinous competition, they will likely fail and many 
procompetitive benefits will not accrue. 
II. ANALYSIS OF THE RUINOUS COMPETITION ARGUMENT BY THE 
COURT IN A NON-SPORTS CONTEXT 
The ruinous competition defense is usually proffered by 
competitors attempting to justify anticompetitive agreements.  
Typically, parties to an agreement argue that in the absence of such 
agreement, competition would drive firms in a particular industry 
into bankruptcy, eventually leaving consumers at the mercy of a 
monopolist.47  The Supreme Court, however, has almost uniformly 
rejected the ruinous competition defense.48  Indeed, the Court has 
 
 46 See Roberts, supra note 36, at 231. 
 47 Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 127. 
 48 See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (rejecting the 
ruinous competition defense because of its controversial nature, and because the Court did 
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rejected this defense in cases involving naked price-fixing 
agreements,49 cartels, and resale-price-maintenance agreements.50 
The Court in these cases has rejected the defense for various 
reasons.  Courts typically do not want to condone price-fixing, and 
economic scholars often believe that agreements among competitors 
are ineffective.51  Another reason the Court has rejected the ruinous 
competition defense is that it believes that it is inappropriate for a 
court to determine a reasonable rate of return for an industry.52 
It is clear that excluding NCAA cases, the Court has typically 
refused to allow firms to justify anticompetitive restrictions on the 
grounds that requiring industry members to compete with each other 
would lead to ruinous competition.53  The various NCAA cases 
discussed above, however, show an implied acceptance by courts of 
the NCAAs version of the ruinous competition defense and would 
enable the Court to allow start-up sports leagues to also use the 
ruinous competition defense. 
 
not want to be forced to determine a reasonable rate of profit for an industry); United States 
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940) (holding that fear of ruinous 
competition is not a justification for price-fixing); Fashion Originators Guild of Am. v. 
Fed. Trade Commn, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (holding that dress designers were prevented 
from acting in collusion to ensure that their investment in original clothing designs be 
recouped); Natl Socy of Profl Engrs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689-90 (1978) 
(rejecting a professional associations canon of ethics because it illegally fixed prices).  But 
see Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933) (holding that competing 
coal producers could form an agreement for the purpose of promoting efficiency, provided 
that the intent was not to unreasonably restrain trade). 
 49 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified, 175 
U.S. 211, 273 (1899) (rejecting a naked price-fixing agreement among steel pipe 
manufacturers created for the purpose of avoiding huge losses that might result because of 
competition between the companies). 
 50 Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 134. 
 51 Id. at 138. 
 52 Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 331-32. 
 53 See Stephen F. Ross, The Misunderstood Alliance Between Sports Fans, Players and 
the Antitrust Laws, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 519, 544 (1997); see also Mackey v. Natl Football 
League, 543 F.2d 606, 621 (8th Cir. 1976). 
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III. THE COURTS TREATMENT OF NCAA JUSTIFICATIONS WARRANTS 
REDUCED ANTITRUST SCRUTINY OF START-UP SPORTS LEAGUES 
In todays world, new professional sports leagues face an 
extremely competitive and crowded marketplace.  In an effort to 
limit costs, each new league has been formed as a single entity.54  In 
addition to the perceived cost-effectiveness of the league structure, 
the single entity offers protection from the antitrust laws because 
there can be no agreement that violates section 1 of the Sherman Act 
if there is only one actor making decisions.55  There have been 
challenges, however, to the validity of the single-entity structure.56  
In Fraser, the players have alleged that the single-entity structure of 
MLS is a sham, and charged the league with antitrust violations.57 
Regardless of whether start-up leagues are true single entities, the 
conduct of these start-up sports leagues should be subject to less 
strict antitrust scrutiny than is applied to other industries.  A 
professional sports league is in a unique industry that deserves 
special protection because of the extraordinarily high start-up costs.58  
These leagues should be able to employ restrictions that enable a 
league to limit labor costs and recoup other heavy start-up costs.  As 
discussed above, courts have demonstrated great deference towards 
the NCAAs alleged anticompetitive conduct, and have permitted use 
of the NCAAs version of the ruinous competition argument by often 
upholding NCAA restrictions on the grounds that the rules are 
necessary to preserve amateurism and to maintain competitive 
balance among member schools. 
The NCAAs amateurism argument is a sham, however, and start-
up sports leagues can readily be compared to the NCAA.  Start-up 
sports leagues, like the NCAA, also need the ability to create 
 
 54 This includes MLS, WUSA, the WNBA, and the XFL. 
 55 A single firm is not subject to liability under section 1 of the Sherman Act, because a 
combination restraining trade requires the presence of at least two independent actors.  
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984). 
 56 See Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 7 F. Supp. 2d 73 (D. Mass. 1998). 
 57 Id. 
 58 These include very high labor and operation costs, such as building new stadiums.  It 
is necessary to incur these costs because they lend an element of legitimacy to new leagues. 
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restrictions that maintain competitive balance.  Because of the 
similarities between new sports leagues and the NCAA, and start-up 
leagues corresponding need for protection, the Court should permit 
start-up professional sports leagues to employ necessary restrictions.  
If the Court fails to permit these necessary restrictions, new leagues 
will be unsustainable and will collapse. 
In Section A of this Part, several comparisons will be drawn 
revealing the similarities between start-up sports leagues and          
the NCAA.  Section B will examine how the NCAAs 
commercialization, and its departure from the amateur ideals upon 
which it was founded, make start-up sports leagues indistinguishable 
from the NCAA.  Section C will discuss the unique nature of sports 
leagues relative to other industries.  It will also discuss the 
procompetitive benefits that teams in start-up leagues generate, and 
argue that start-ups, like the NCAA, should be able to use the ruinous 
competition argument as grounds for reduced antitrust scrutiny.  
Without reduced antitrust scrutiny, these new leagues will fail and 
various procompetitive benefits will be sacrificed.  Section D will 
briefly propose that a few restraints that are typically challenged 
should be permitted in a start-up league to ensure its long-term 
viability. 
A.  Comparison of Start-Up Sports Leagues to the NCAA 
The NCAA was founded upon ideals of amateurism.59  This 
idealism has disappeared from the NCAA, however, and been 
replaced by a multi-billion-dollar industry and, consequently, the 
commercialization of NCAA student-athletes.60  Despite the 
pervasive commercialism and subsequent shift away from the basis 
upon which the NCAA was founded, one of the main reasons why 
 
 59 See Const., supra note 22, at art. 1.2(c).  One of the purposes of the NCAA is [t]o 
encourage its members to adopt eligibility rules to comply with . . . standards of scholarship, 
sportsmanship and amateurism.  Id. 
 60 Pekron, supra note 26, at 27 n.15 (citing Mike McGraw et al., Money Games Inside 
the NCAA: Revenues Dominate College Sports World, KAN. CITY STAR, Oct. 5, 1997, at A1 
(noting that college athletics generates almost two billion dollars in annual revenue for the 
305 schools in Division I athletics)). 
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the courts have allowed NCAA restrictions that would otherwise be 
deemed anticompetitive to stand, is the belief that the restrictions 
somehow preserve this amateur tradition.61  In many respects, 
though, a start-up sports league is indistinguishable from the NCAA. 
1. Start-Up Sports Leagues, Like the NCAA, Have Power to 
Determine their Labor Costs 
The NCAA has complete power over the amount of money that it 
spends on labor, which limits both the salary and the number of 
athletes that any member school can employ.62  The NCAA limits the 
salary that its athletes receive to the cost of attending the 
respective member institution, plus money for room and board.  The 
NCAA also limits the number of players that are permitted on each 
teams roster.  Former Executive Director of the NCAA, Richard 
Schultz, conceded that a primary reason stipends (beyond the value 
of tuition, room and board) are not paid to student-athletes is to 
lower costs.63  This is comparable to professional sports in that many 
start-up leagues have low salary caps that limit the amount of money 
that a team can spend on its athletes, as well as strict roster 
restrictions that limit the number of players on each team.  These 
rules are used to lower costs and maintain competitive balance 
among the teams by suppressing wages to a level that is beneath 
market value and is affordable for all teams. 
The NCAA has complete power over the marketplace because any 
athlete who desires to play college (or most professional) sports has 
no choice but to accept the NCAAs restrictions.64  This is analogous 
to professional sports, where there is only one major league in each 
sport.65  For example, if an athlete wants to play professional 
 
 61 Id. at 28. 
 62 Id. at 27. 
 63 Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust: Should College Students Be Paid to Play?, 65 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 206, 217 (1990). 
 64 See Pekron, supra note 26, at 27.  An athlete has the option to bypass college and 
play professional sports immediately, but only Major League Baseball has an organized 
minor league for players that are unable to play at the highest level. 
 65 Of course minor leagues exist in every sport.  But in each sport there is one 
established league where the best players participate.  For a discussion and history of the 
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baseball in the Unites States he must submit to the rules created by 
Major League Baseball. 
2. Start-Up Sports Leagues, Like the NCAA, Have Power to 
Sanction Members 
Also comparable to professional sports leagues, the NCAA 
functions as a governing body that employs strict enforcement 
procedures for rules violations, and the guilty must comply with any 
sanctions imposed for violations of NCAA rules.66  Violation of rules 
in either professional leagues or the NCAA can subject a team or 
member institution to harsh penalties.67  The NCAA has a committee 
that makes recommendations regarding penalties for rules violations, 
while professional sports leagues have a commissioner that is 
responsible for doling out punishment when rules violations occur. 
3. Start-Up Sports Leagues, Like the NCAA, Crown a Single 
Champion 
For years the NCAA resisted the lure of trying to crown a 
champion in college football.  In recent years, however, the NCAA 
has created a system designed to determine an overall champion in 
college football.  The creation of the Bowl Championship Series by 
the NCAA enables the two highest rated teams in college football to 
play in a game to crown a national champion.  More importantly, 
perhaps, the new system creates enormous revenues for the teams 
and closely resembles the Super Bowl.68  This is yet another 
 
notion that only one major league of each sport can flourish, see Part III. C., infra. 
 66 Pekron, supra note 26, at 27; see also McCormack v. Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn, 
845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988); Justice v. Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn, 577 F. Supp. 356 
(D. Ariz. 1983). 
 67 See McCormack, 845 F.2d 1338.  In the NBA, the Minnesota Timberwolves recently 
received a harsh punishment from the Commissioners office for trying to circumvent the 
salary cap. 
 68 See Goldman, supra note 63, at 217 (noting that member institutions are constantly 
seeking new ways to maximize revenues, and suggesting that the playoff system is not 
motivated by a desire to determine the number one school, or even to enhance amateurism, 
but rather to increase revenues). 
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similarity between college sports and their professional counterparts, 
as all professional leagues are designed to determine a champion of 
the respective leagues through an extensive playoff system that 
generates huge television-rights fees. 
B. The Professionalization of College Sports Has Pierced the 
NCAAs Veil of Amateurism and Makes the NCAA and 
Professional Sports Indistinguishable 
Although the NCAA was founded upon ideals of amateurism, 
collegiate sports are now thoroughly commercialized.  Indeed, one 
court acknowledged, College [sports are] a terrific American 
institution that generates nonpecuniary benefits for players and fans, 
but it is also a vast commercial venture that yields substantial profits 
for colleges both on and off the field.69 
At the highest level of the NCAA, athletes are at least 
semiprofessionals, as they receive several thousand dollars per year 
(in the form of a scholarship) for playing sports, often with the goal 
of playing professional sports for much more money.70  In fact, at 
some schools, college football players receive a wage of 
approximately nine dollars per hour for their work in football and 
football-related activities.71  Some coaches make salaries well in 
excess of any other university employee.72  A university certainly 
 
 69 Banks v. Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn, 977 F.2d 1081, 1099 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(Flaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Gaines v. Natl Collegiate Athletic 
Assn, 746 F. Supp. 738, 743 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) ([W]hile organized as a non-profit 
organization, the NCAAand its member institutionsare . . . engaged in a business 
venture of far greater magnitude than the vast majority of profit-making enterprises.) 
(citing Hennessey v. Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn, 564 F.2d 1136, 1149 (5th Cir. 1977)). 
 70 Pekron, supra note 26, at 56; Gary R. Roberts, The NCAA, Antitrust, and Consumer 
Welfare, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2631, 2658 (1996); see also Goldman, supra note 63, at 234 
(Athletes are often motivated by a desire to reap the rewards of a professional career.).  If 
on scholarship, the athlete receives free tuition, books, and room and board, a salary that 
totals several thousand dollars per year.  Id.  Indeed, a student-athletes relationship with its 
member school has been compared to that of an employer-employee relationship.  Schott, 
supra note 14, at 34-35. 
 71 Pekron, supra note 26 (citing RICHARD G. SHEEHAN, KEEPING SCORE: THE 
ECONOMICS OF BIG-TIME SPORTS 296-98 (1996)). 
 72 Pekron, supra note 26, at 57.  The average college football coach makes at least four 
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would not subsidize athletes and pay coaches large amounts of 
money unless the school realized a financial reward.  The cost-
benefit analysis for many schools is simple, as the sports programs 
often generate millions of dollars for their university.73 
In football bowl games,74 the NCAA permits oversized corporate 
logos to be sewn on to jerseys of the participating teams. 75  These 
patches identifying the bowl game sponsors are not subject to the 
size limits created in the rule that was challenged in Adidas.76  Not 
coincidentally, these sponsors pay the NCAA a tremendous amount 
of money to earn this sponsorship right.  This blatant hypocrisy by 
the NCAA reveals that if the price is right, the players can become 
walking billboards.77 
Total revenues in the NCAA have increased 8000% in the last 
quarter century.78  The NCAA has increased these revenues with 
little concern for how the athletes are affected, either physically or in 
the classroom.79  Some players cannot even choose what shoes they 
will wear, as some athletes are forced to wear athletic shoes 
designated by the terms of their coachs large contract with a shoe 
manufacturer.80 
As part of the amateur foundation of the NCAA, it was also 
thought that each student-athletes primary reason to be in college 
 
times as much as the average professor at the same institution.  See FRANCIS X. DEALY, JR., 
WIN AT ANY COST:  THE SELL OUT OF COLLEGE ATHLETICS 165 (1990). 
 73 See NAND HART-NIBBRIG & CLEMENT COTTINGHAM, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
COLLEGE SPORTS 3 (1986). 
 74 Bowl games are postseason games that serve as a reward to college football teams 
that have had a successful season. 
 75 See Mitten, supra note 41, at 6. 
 76 Adidas Am., Inc. v. Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (D. Kan. 
1999). 
 77 Teams participating in the Bowl Championship Series may each receive over $10 
million per school.  Apparently, this is enough revenue for the NCAA to discard its moral 
high ground. 
 78 Pekron, supra note 26 (citing McGraw, supra note 60, at A1).  In the 1990s corporate 
sponsorships increased sevenfold.  Id. 
 79 See Goldman, supra note 63, at 241 (noting how lengthy basketball and football 
seasons and late night game times to increase television exposure represent commercial 
concerns prevailing over educational interests). 
 80 Id. at 241 n.265 (citing Brown, Rubber Sole: Should College Basketball Coaches 
Accept Sneaker Money?, 7 ENT. & SPORTS L. 3 (1989)). 
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was to get an education.81  The professionalization of college sports, 
however, has contributed to a reduced emphasis on the pursuit of an 
education.  Indeed, at many of the schools with premier athletic 
programs, a student-athletes education is less important than the 
team for which they play.82  The lack of emphasis on a student-
athletes education is further evidence of the NCAAs increasing 
professionalization. 
The NCAA has clearly deviated from its purely amateur origins 
and become professionalized.83  While some remnants of amateurism 
certainly remain, the receipt of scholarships and stipends, the 
sponsorships on the uniforms, the shoe deals, and the lack of 
emphasis on education all evidence how the NCAA has become 
increasingly commercialized.  Indeed, the NCAA does not even 
require that athletes truly receive no payments for their athletic skills, 
as it permits athletes to participate in one NCAA sport even if they 
are professionals in a different sport.84 
C. Start-Up Sports Leagues, Like the NCAA, Should Enjoy Reduced 
Antitrust Scrutiny 
Courts have chosen to overlook the commercialization of the 
NCAA and continue to show great deference to that organization in 
an effort to preserve college sports.  Start-up sports leagues are 
comparable to the NCAA and should also be subject to reduced 
antitrust scrutiny.  This would enable the new leagues to use the 
NCAAs version of the ruinous competition defense to ensure their 
survival in  todays  crowded  sports  and entertainment marketplace. 
 
 81 See Pekron, supra note 26, at 55-56. 
 82 Id. at 58.  Only a minimum level of proficiency is required of an athlete once in 
college.  Id. (reciting story of player at Ohio State University who took classes in AIDS 
awareness, golf, and music appreciation to maintain his eligibility). 
 83 Bill Russell, former star basketball player for the Boston Celtics observed, [t]o me, 
being an amateur is like being a virgin.  It is an old idea that has some innocence and charm, 
celebrated mostly by people to whom it does not apply.  Goldman, supra note 63, at 234. 
 84 Pekron, supra note 26, at 60. 
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The balancing test a court employs in a rule of reason analysis85 
typically has limited appreciation for noncommercial or 
noneconomic motives that may underlie a particular industry 
practice.86  The Court in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,87 however, 
implied that noncommercial factors may be considered in the 
antitrust calculus.88  In United States v. Brown University,89 the court 
also held that noncommercial justifications should be considered.90  
This is important because a start-up sports league generates many 
noneconomic benefits that should be considered when evaluating the 
legality of a particular restraint by a new league. 
Courts need to recognize and appreciate that a sports league is 
different from other industries because cooperation among member 
teams is necessary, as sports teams are incapable of producing 
anything of value independently.91  Although a start-up leagues 
conduct may restrain trade to some degree, these industry restraints 
are not so harmful that they lack any redeeming value.92  Certain 
conduct that start-up sports leagues engage in may not have the 
overall effect of enhancing intraleague competition, but it may 
 
 85 Under the rule of reason, an antitrust defendant has the opportunity to provide 
evidence of procompetitive justifications in support of a challenged activity.  These 
procompetitive features are then balanced against any discoverable anticompetitive effects 
to determine the net competitive significance of the challenged industry practice.  See 
Rosenbaum, supra note 16, at 746 (citing Natl Socy of Profl Engrs v. United States, 435 
U.S. 679, 690 (1978)). 
 86 Rosenbaum, supra note 16, at 746 (noting that while certain noneconomic, 
noncommercial league restraints are anticompetitive in the sense that they do nothing to 
enhance or promote competition off the field, these rules are uniquely procompetitive 
because they ultimately make for a better league product on the field). 
 87 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
 88 Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 771, 787 (1975); see also Lee Goldman, The 
Politically Correct Corporation and the Antitrust Laws: The Proper Treatment of 
Noneconomic or Social Welfare Justifications under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 13 YALE 
L. & POLY REV. 137, 164 (1995) (noting that the language in Goldfarb suggests that courts 
may factor noneconomic considerations into a substantive antitrust analysis). 
 89 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 90 Id. (We conclude that the district court was obliged to more fully investigate the 
procompetitive and noneconomic justifications proffered by MIT than it did when it 
performed the truncated rule of reason analysis.). 
 91 Roberts, supra note 36, at 227-28. 
 92 Rosenbaum, supra note 16, at 746; see also Louis B. Schwartz, Justice and Other 
Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076 (1979) (commenting that the 
goals of justice and the antitrust law demand protection of competitors). 
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nonetheless possess redeeming virtues from a noncommercial 
standpoint that should withstand a reduced level of antitrust scrutiny, 
and also enable the league to survive.93  One commentator noted, 
[t]o be sure, [teams] are vigorous athletic competitors, for that is the 
very essence of the product which they jointly sell.  In no meaningful 
way, however, are the clubs natural economic competitors.94 
1. Sports Leagues Are Extremely Risky and Few Are 
Economically Viable 
The economic health of teams in new leagues is tenuous.95  
Creating a professional sports league is extremely expensive, as there 
are massive labor and operational costs.  New leagues need time to 
develop competitive teams, attract a loyal fan following, and recoup 
heavy start-up costs.96  Accomplishing these tasks is nearly 
impossible if start-up leagues are subject to the same antitrust 
scrutiny as other industries because parity, and thus consumer 
interest, would be difficult to maintain with little centralized control.  
Without centralized control, it is likely that a dominant team or two 
would emerge because of their relative financial strength to other 
teams in the league, and too little interest in the league would be 
developed in the markets with unsuccessful teams.  Start-up sports 
leagues should therefore be permitted to engage in conduct that is 
subject to less strict antitrust scrutiny. 
Sports leagues present a unique form of industrial organization that 
bears little resemblance to other industries, particularly those that are 
more frequently the target of antitrust review.97  In contrast to other 
industries, league teams do not attempt, nor do they desire, to drive 
one another out of the market.98  Courts long ago recognized this, 
 
 93 Rosenbaum, supra note 16, at 746. 
 94 Roberts, supra note 36, at 231. 
 95 See McBurney, supra note 10, at 950. 
 96 Id. 
 97 See Rosenbaum, supra note 16, at 744. 
 98 See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).  If stronger teams 
were to drive weaker teams out of the market, there would eventually be too few teams to 
operate the league.  See McBurney, supra note 10, at 932 (citing United States v. Natl 
Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319, 323 (E.D. Pa. 1953)).  Although some leagues, like 
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and consequently, the unique nature of professional sports.99  This 
recognition of the unique nature of sports has not translated, 
however, into judicial deference when analyzing professional 
leagues restraints.  This lack of deference persists despite the 
treatment courts have afforded the NCAA in implicitly permitting 
use of the ruinous competition argument. 
In professional sports, it has been proved through the success and 
failures of various leagues that the sports industry is extremely risky 
and costly.100  In almost all of the current major sports, rival 
leagues have emerged over the years only to quickly merge with the 
existing league or disappear altogether.101  This is because high costs 
 
Major League Baseball, are currently considering contraction, a league would certainly 
prefer to not be forced to contract. 
 99 See NFL, 116 F. Supp. at 323. 
The ordinary business makes every effort to sell as much of its products or services 
as it can.  In the course of doing this it may and often does put many of its 
competitors out of the business.  The ordinary businessman is not troubled by the 
knowledge that he is doing so well that his competitors are being driven out of 
business.  Professional teams in a league, however, must not compete too well with 
each other in a business way. . . .  If all teams should compete as hard as they can 
in a business way, the stronger teams would likely drive the weaker ones into 
financial failure.  If this should happen not only would the weaker teams fail, but 
eventually the whole league, both the weaker and the stronger teams, would fail, 
because without a league no team can operate profitably.  Id. 
 100 See Roberts, supra note 36, at 257. 
 101 Id. The American Football League formed in 1960.  Six years later, after both the 
AFL and the NFL experienced financial difficulties as a result of frequent bidding wars for 
players, Congress authorized a merger between the two leagues that bypassed antitrust 
scrutiny and avoided financial ruin of the two leagues.  Rosenbaum, supra note 16, at 771 
n.180 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982)).  In 1974, the World Football League [hereinafter 
WFL] emerged as a challenger to the NFL.  The WFL never became a legitimate threat and 
went bankrupt approximately one year after its formation.  Id. (citing Mid-South Grizzlies v. 
Natl Football League, 550 F. Supp. 558, 562 (E.D. Pa. 1982), affd, 720 F.2d 772, 776 (3d 
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984).  The United States Football League 
[hereinafter USFL] emerged as yet another challenger to the NFL in the 1980s.  The USFL 
charged the NFL with monopolistic conduct in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act, 
and after being awarded nominal damages, the league disappeared as a threat to the NFL.  
See United States Football League v. Natl Football League, 644 F. Supp. 1040, 1042 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986).  The XFL was the last challenger to the NFL.  This League shut down 
operations after only one season, despite the financial backing of the NBC network.  From 
1949 to 1959, the NBA served as the only professional league until the American Basketball 
League began play.  The League fell apart, but only after one-and-one-half years due to 
mounting financial losses.  Rosenbaum, supra note 16, at 771 n.180.  In 1966 another 
challenger to the NBA emerged, the American Basketball Association, which operated for 
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involved with the sports industry, such as signing players and 
building stadiums, make running a successful league particularly 
risky.  Subjecting a new league to reduced antitrust scrutiny will 
therefore provide start-up leagues with the assurance that they will be 
able to create restraints to enhance parity and consumer interest in 
their product, in much the same way as the NCAA has done. 
2. Procompetitive Benefits of Sports 
As part of the balancing test used by a court in the rule of reason, 
the procompetitive benefits of a particular restraint are weighed 
against the anticompetitive effects of the restraint.102  This Note 
argues that as a general rule, start-up sports leagues should not be 
subject to the same level of antitrust scrutiny that established leagues 
and industries are, because new leagues are subject to much greater 
risks than either existing leagues or different industries.  Without 
such heightened protection from antitrust scrutiny, any new league 
will surely fail.  It is important for new leagues to flourish because of 
the procompetitive economic benefits that successful leagues create, 
as well as important noneconomic benefits that leagues also tend to 
generate.  It is therefore important to identify and discuss the 
procompetitive benefits (both economic and noneconomic) that 
sports leagues usually produce. 
There are significant economic benefits that accrue from a sports 
league.  One of these benefits is downtown urban renewal.103  A new 
stadium is likely to spur economic development in the area 
surrounding the stadium because of the development of many mid-
 
ten years, only to merge some of its franchises with the NBA.  Id.  From 1917 to 1971, the 
National Hockey League [hereinafter NHL] operated alone until the World Hockey 
Association emerged, only to partly disband and merge with the NHL eight years later.  Id.  
In womens basketball, two leagues began simultaneously in 1997, yet within three years 
one of the leagues folded.  See Elizabeth Clarke, WNBA Has Next and Beyond; League 
Building Quickly With Passionate Following, PALM BEACH POST, June 20, 1999, at 1C. 
 102 See Rosenbaum, supra note 16, at 746 (citing Natl Socy of Profl Engrs v. United 
States, 435 U.S. 679, 689-90 (1978)). 
 103 See John R. Dorocak, Tax Advantages of Sports Franchises: Part IThe Stadium, 
1999 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 579 (1999). 
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size businesses that relocate near the stadium.104  This is a benefit 
that is unique to professional sports leagues because in the absence 
of such a team, newly created businesses and jobs surrounding the 
new stadium would go undeveloped. 
Another benefit of start-up sports leagues is that teams have the 
ability to significantly impact a citys local economy.  One study 
revealed that the annual local economic impact of one NFL team was 
$120 million.105  While start-up sports leagues teams would 
certainly not be able to generate that amount of revenue for a city in 
its initial stages, there would definitely be some positive economic 
impact in the form of construction jobs created, new spending in the 
community by people who attend games, and the attraction of 
tourists to a city with a new sports facility.106  These procompetitive 
benefits only have the opportunity to accrue if start-up sports leagues 
are subject to less strict antitrust scrutiny.  In the absence of reduced 
scrutiny the new leagues are unlikely to make large capital 
investments in things like a new stadium or arena because of a 
leagues potential for quick failure. 
Historically, under rule of reason analysis, courts have primarily 
analyzed allegedly anticompetitive conduct in terms of their 
economic effects, judging the reasonableness of a restraint by its 
effect on the commercial marketplace.107  The Court in Goldfarb, 
however, implied that noncommercial factors may be applied in the 
antitrust calculus.108  In the context of new sports leagues there are 
many intangible noneconomic benefits generated that should be 
weighed when determining the legality of any restraints. 
 
 104 Id. 
 105 See Robert Taylor Bowling, Sports Aggravated: The Fans Guide to the Franchise 
Relocation Problem in Professional Sports, 28 STETSON L. REV. 645, 652 (1999). 
 106 See Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist, Sports, Jobs, and Taxes: Are Stadiums 
Worth the Cost?, 1997 BROOKINGS REV. 35 (1997), available at 1997 WL 10193568.  There 
is also a multiplier effect, as increased local income causes further new spending and job 
creation.  Id.  The multiplier effect is the amplified effect of newly generated money that is 
used to indicate how an increase in spending causes an increase in income.  See Bowling, 
supra note 105, at 652. 
 107 See Wendy T. Kirby & T. Clark Weymouth, Antitrust and Amateur Sports: The Role 
of Noneconomic Values, 61 IND. L.J. 31 (1985). 
 108 See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 771, 787 (1975). 
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Teams in professional sports leagues are considered unique 
cultural assets.109  Economists and other commentators have 
acknowledged that sports teams, and thus sports leagues, can spark a 
citys economy and confer on a locality intangible benefits such as 
entertainment, civic pride, and national television exposure.110  
Indeed, sports teams also have the ability to create a cultural identity 
that crosses race, ethnic and class lines.111 
Sports teams also provide local communities with consumption 
benefits, which are comparable to benefits provided by parks, golf 
courses, swimming pools, and concert halls.112  Different from these 
other forms of entertainment, however, sports teams consumption 
benefits have unique economic characteristics because local residents 
benefit from the mere presence of a professional team in the 
community.113  Indeed, sports teams capture public attention far out 
of proportion to their economic significance, as the media provides 
attention to the teams because of how passionate fans are.114  None 
of these intangible benefits can accrue to a community that hosts a 
team in a start-up league unless such a league is provided protection 
from the antitrust laws, because new leagues will fail if subject to 
strict antitrust scrutiny, due to an inability to ensure parity and to 
maintain low labor costs. 
D. Restraints that Should Be Permissible by a Start-Up Sports 
League 
Certainly, a start-up sports league should not have a blanket 
exemption from antitrust law.  Rather, only restraints that permit a 
start-up league to begin to recoup some of its investment and reduce 
 
 109 See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposal for the Antitrust Regulation of Professional 
Sports, 79 B.U. L. REV. 889, 913 (1999). 
 110 See Dorocak, supra note 102; see also John Riley, Fields of Green, NEWSDAY, Aug. 
18, 1996, at A04. 
 111 See Bowling, supra note 105, at 649. 
 112 See Kevin Green, et al., Using Tax-Exempt Bonds to Finance Professional Sports 
Stadiums, 78 TAX NOTES 1663, 1672 (1998). 
 113 Id. at 1666; see also Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 106 (acknowledging that a teams 
new stadium generates more local consumer satisfaction than alternative investments). 
 114 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 106. 
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some of the risks associated with beginning a new league should be 
permissible.  A complete discussion of the specific impact of each 
restraint is beyond the scope of this paper, but some restraints that a 
league should be allowed to employ include a salary cap, a rule 
limiting player mobility that resembles baseballs old reserve 
clause,115 and a rule limiting a teams ability to relocate.  These 
rules would generally enable a league to keep costs low in the 
beginning stages of a leagues existence, create parity among the 
teams, and enable teams to develop roots in markets that the league 
feels are best for the overall good of the league. 
CONCLUSION 
Start-up sports leagues should be entitled to use the NCAAs 
version of the ruinous competition defense to justify reduced 
antitrust scrutiny.  Courts have permitted this defense to be used by 
the NCAA to justify restrictions that reduce competition among 
member schools off the field and increase parity on the field, thus 
enabling the product of NCAA sports to continue to exist.  Start-up 
sports leagues are comparable to the NCAA because of the extensive 
commercialization of the organization in recent years.  Sports 
leagues are extremely risky investments that generate significant 
procompetitive economic and intangible benefits for society.  
Consequently, permitting new leagues to be subject to reduced 
antitrust scrutiny would enable the survival of new sports leagues 
and the accrual of accompanying procompetitive benefits. 
 
 
 115 The reserve clause was a device used in professional baseball that enabled a team to 
reserve the rights to a players services even after expiration of a players contract.  
Rosenbaum, supra note 16.  It was used as a way to create parity in a league.  Id. 
